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My project today is to examine the scope of that most central of
lawyerly duties, the duty of zealous representation, and its relation to
narrative. Specifically, I want to explore the tension that arises
between the progressive lawyer's political commitment to anti-
subordination on the one hand, and the particular demands of an
individual client's case on the other. The question presented is: Do
the ethical rules permit, or even require, lawyers to strategically
deploy racist, sexist or homophobic narratives that will advance their
clients' interests? I begin the consideration of this thorny question by
examining a specific teaching tool used in our law school and a series
of complexities generated by it, and then propose a modest
amendment to the ethical rules that would permit lawyers to better
balance their commitments to progressive values and to their clients.
In the Criminal Justice Clinic here at the Washington College of Law,
we have used a simulation for a number of years to explore a range of
issues relating to the nature of the lawyer-client relationship, and, in
particular, approaches to client interviewing and counseling, fact
investigation, and development of case theory.' The simulation
requires that the students defend a thirty-two year old man named
Randy Gilles, who, after a night of drinking with a friend, is accused
of having forced a woman, Deborah Brand, to engage in oral sex with
him and his friend in the backseat of a car. What little information
the students are provided- a police report, the complaining
witness's statement, the charging documents- is, by design, fraught
with inconsistencies and contradictions. The students conduct an
interview of their simulated client in which the client reports that he
and his friend met Brand early in the morning at the hospital, where
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the friend was having his hand stitched up following a barroom
brawl. Brand asked them for a ride home, they agreed, but later
changed their minds and dropped her off well short of her home.
Soon after the client interview, the students are asked to theorize
about what might have happened by brainstorming possible
explanations for what occurred in the early morning hours of the
night in question.
The ambiguity of the facts presented in the simulation lends them
to a wide range of exculpatory possibilities: Brand had consensual sex
but was angry because the two men dropped her off in the middle of
nowhere; Brand was high and made the whole thing up; Brand had
sex with the friend but not with our client; Brand was on medication
that altered her memory.
This set of explanations can be crudely categorized as "crying
rape." As one student put it in the course of a simulated interview,
Deborah Brand was a "stank ho." These student-generated
characterizations provide the basis for a preliminary classroom
discussion of gender, and give rise to a series of feminist inquiries: Do
women lie about rape? What explains our willingness to believe that
they do? Why do we so quickly arrive at such a conclusion? What
histories, assumptions, and stereotypes underlie such a conclusion?
The students continue to generate additional possible explanations
for what happened between Randy Gilles and Deborah Brand, and
inevitably, a student suggests that Brand was trading sex for drugs. Of
course, the "crack whore" defense, as some students describe this
theory, is susceptible to the same feminist critique as the "crying
rape" narrative, but it lends itself to additional critical study on race.
A careful review of the police report reveals that Deborah Brand is
African American. The documents provided to the students fail to
specify the race of the defendant, Randy Gilles. Why does this
matter?
First- and this should be obvious- it is fundamentally different to
identify a black woman as a "crack whore" than it is to so identify a
white woman. Just as crack, by itself, tends to conjure an image of an
African American, the "crack whore" stereotype has been plied in
racial terms. The "crack whore" is in many ways the cousin of the
"welfare queen" : both are, in the popular imagination, irresponsible,
desperate, manipulative, female and black. 2 The "crack whore"
2. See generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 123-25 (1994); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura
Beth Nielson, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional
Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473 (1995).
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defense is thus both gendered and racialized.
Second, if we assume for the moment that Gilles is white, then the
defense is not merely of a woman crying rape, but of a black woman
crying rape against a white man. When we make a critical inquiry of
this narrative, we can find, not too far under the surface, a case
similar to that of Tawana Brawley;3 if we dig deeper, we uncover a
long Jim Crow history of disbelief when black women accuse white
men of rape;4 if we dig deeper still, we see a slave history of
slaveowner rape of black women with complete and utter impunity.5
In short, the feminist objection to the defense is incomplete without
an attendant critique of the racialized dimension of the problem, just
as the critical race critique is wanting without a consideration of
gender. A "crack whore" is not just a crack whore; there is more to it
than that.
Let me note that despite the imaginative, and perhaps speculative,
nature of the exercise of brainstorming case theories, the students
rarely address Deborah Brand's sexual orientation. By positing the
"crying rape" defense, they implicitly theorize about Brand's gender
(i.e., what kind of woman is she?). By suggesting the "crack whore"
3. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 161-78 (1991)
(discussing the case of fifteen year-old Tawana Brawley, who in 1987 told police that
she was kidnapped by six white men and taken to the woods near her home in
Wappinger Falls, New York, and raped). Brawley was found disoriented in a vacant
lot, with cigarette burns on her body, "KKK" and "Nigger" written on her torso, and
smeared with feces. A New York grand jury concluded that Brawley had fabricated
the story. But as Patricia Williams notes, Brawley's story fit into a larger narrative of
disbelief. "Tawana's terrible story has every black woman's worst fears and
experiences wrapped into it. Few will believe a black woman who has been raped by
a white man." Id. at 174.
4. See generally Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body
Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 722-25 (2002) (describing
incidents where white men exhibited a high degree of skepticism toward reports that
black women had been sexually victimized); Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The
Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225, 237
(2002) (explaining that in the late nineteenth century, the legal system did not
acknowledge that white men could rape black women or that black women could be
raped); Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the "Sistahs": The Peculiar
Treatment of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDERZ RACE &
JUST. 625, 626-28 (2000) (asserting that African American women are "particularly
and peculiarly susceptible to being disbelieved, especially regarding sexual
harassment and assault); Angela P. Harris, Race & Existentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 599 (1990) (noting that even after the Civil War, black
women were considered promiscuous by nature and that historically, raping black
women was not considered a crime).
5. See Harris, supra note 4, at 598 (stating that " [d]uring slavery, the sexual
abuse of black women by white men was commonplace."); see also bell hooks, Ain't I a
Woman: Black Women and Feminism, in LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 358 (Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows eds.,
1994) (asserting that white male slaveowners wanted enslaved black women to accept
sexual exploitation as the right and privilege of those in power).
120 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 11:1
defense, they implicitly theorize about Brand's gender and race (i.e.,
what kind of black woman is she?). But in both instances, sexual
orientation is left uninterrogated, which is to say that even the
students' tentative inquiries into gender, race, and gender and race,
are presumptively heterosexual. This is, I think, a sign of how deeply
closeted sexual orientation remains in even the most progressive of
lawyering processes: our consideration of poor black women never
countenances the possibility that they might not be straight. To
theorize on Brand's sexuality is more than a fanciful digression. In a
case where the existence of and consent to a heterosexual sexual
encounter are fundamental, the sexual orientation of the putative
crime victim may be of enormous relevance. While far from
conclusive, Brand's sexual orientation may influence a factfinder's
determination of her credibility regarding the sexual conduct
alleged. For example, a jury may be less willing to believe that Brand
had consensual sex with a man if they believe her to be a lesbian. I
do not mean to be reductive about sexuality; sexual identity is hardly
determinative of sexual conduct, but it is, within the confines of the
courtroom, at the very least probative.
This blind spot reminds us of the importance of Marl Matsuda's
demand that we ask the "other question."' 6 As Professor Matsuda
writes: "When I see something that looks racist, I ask, 'Where is the
patriarchy in this?' When I see something that looks sexist, I ask,
'Where is the heterosexism in this? When I see something that looks
homophobic, I ask, 'Where are the class interests in this?" In so
doing, we are forced "to look for both the obvious and non-obvious
relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of
subordination ever stands alone."'8  Feminist and critical race
inquiries are, then, inadequate, and leave the progressive lawyer's
project incomplete. A fuller understanding of subordination, and a
greater attention to it, demand the embrace and incorporation of
sexual orientation into the progressive lawyer's case analysis.
After exploring these various narratives underlying the "crying
rape" and "crack whore" defenses-what I term subordinating
narratives- I ask my students the following questions: "So what? Is
there anything wrong with advancing these defenses? More broadly,
is there anything wrong with advancing arguments that, while
advantageous to our clients, may reinforce subordinating racist,
6. Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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sexist, or homophobic stereotypes?"
The reinforcement of homophobic stereotypes is perhaps best
exemplified by the "Jenny Jones case," where a guest on a talk show,
Jonathan Schmitz, killed a gay man who had confessed his affection
for Schmitz on air.' The defendant claimed that he killed out of the
embarrassment that such a confession, and the implication that
Schmitz might be a homosexual, caused.'1 This has been labeled the
"homophobic panic" defense.
1
The "so what?" question demands two lines of inquiry: a doctrinal
examination of the rules of ethics and a normative consideration of
fairness. Professors Abbe Smith and Anthony Alfieri have engaged
for some years now in a rather contentious debate on the subject,
much of which has centered upon what is different or special about
criminal defense as opposed to other practices of law. 2 The debate is
too complicated to render in its entirety here. In typical academic
form, my point is not to answer the question one way or another, as
Smith and Alfieri endeavor to do, but to highlight the tensions that
arise in the inquiry, and to demand that such tensions not be swept
under the rug, or, apropos of this symposium, be closeted.
We can begin to understand the tensions this way: the progressive
lawyer has an age-old duty of zealous representation on the one hand
and a chosen commitment to anti-subordination on the other. The
duty of zealous representation provides, as Lord Brougham famously
said in 1821, that "to save [a] client by all means and expedients, and
at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to
himself, is [the lawyer's] first and only duty." " That is to say, in the
9. See People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (stating
that the defendant shot the victim three days after appearing on the Jenny Jones talk
show).
10. See id. (noting that the defendant claimed he was humiliated and betrayed by
the experience on the talk show).
11. See generally Kara S. Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic
Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 279 (arguing that homosexual panic defense
is based on social and institutional prejudice toward gays and lesbians despite its
pretensions to psychiatric disorder); see also Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768 (describing
the defense as one of diminished capacity).
12. Compare Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in
Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1595 (1999) (arguing that a criminal defense
attorney's primary concern should be for his or her client's rights, not justice for the
larger racial community the client associates themselves with), with Anthony V.
Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1357-63 (1998) (promoting race-conscious
ethical rules for advocacy), and Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306, 1339-42 (1995) (deploring the use of racial narratives by
criminal defense lawyers because of the harm such stories inflict upon the
community).
13. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 65-66 (1990)
(quoting Lord Brougham in his representation of the Queen in Queen Caroline's
2002]
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course of representation, a lawyer should do everything that a lawyer
is allowed to do so long as it is advantageous to the client. Although
articulated by Lord Brougham in the context of criminal defense
(the defense of Queen Caroline), as embodied in the rules of
ethics-Canon 7 of the Model Code 4 and in the Model Rules, the
preamble and the comment to Rule 1.31S-the duty of zealous
representation applies to lawyers in all types of representation. The
commitment to anti-subordination is something I presume on the
part of the progressive lawyer, my only concern today.
The tension arises when we consider modes of persuasion and the
centrality of narrative. Narrative, or storytelling, is the primary means
by which we as lawyers advance our clients' causes. Alfieri suggests
that narrative is the "constructed core of the lawyering process." " By
describing it as "constructed," Alfieri highlights the fact that
narratives are flexible and contingent, subject to the choices that
lawyers and clients make as to what to include and what to exclude,
what to foreground and what to background. Because narratives are
constructed and do not merely exist in the ether, there for us to
discover, the choices we make as to what narratives to construct are
subject to moral and ethical scrutiny.
One obvious reason to use storytelling in our lawyering is that it is
persuasive. In order for a story to be persuasive, it must resonate with
the values, beliefs and assumptions of our audience. Our story ought
to resonate with stories our audience is already familiar with and to
which it already subscribes: the heroic firefighter, the Good
Samaritan. Of course, our audience of judges and jurors may well
subscribe to far more pernicious stories: the helpless woman victim,
the crack whore, the lascivious fag. There is, of course, a strategic call
to make as to which narratives our audiences actually believe and
those they do not. At the end of the day, though, in order for our
narratives to be effective, they must draw upon prevailing norms and
beliefs, no matter how problematic they may be. As Abbe Smith
writes, "Prejudice exists in the community and in the courthouse,
and criminal defense lawyers would be foolhardy not to recognize
Case).
14. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981) ("The duty of a
lawyer, both to the client and to the legal system, is to represent the client zealously
within the bounds of the law... ").
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (maintaining that " [a]s
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002)
(providing that " [a] lawyer must act... with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.").
16. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 12, at 1303.
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this as a fact of life." 17
But this is where the tension lies: some thirty years after the end of
de jure racial and gender discrimination, our ability to discern
discrimination, and structural forms of discrimination in particular,
depends largely upon critical insights, such as the recognition that
the characterization of Deborah Brand as a crack whore plays upon
subtle, deep-seated stereotypes centered around race and gender.
The same is true, I would argue, with regard to sexual orientation, for
although much of the homophobia expressed today is obvious on its
face, so much more exists in more subterranean forms. Moreover, we
can learn from the inability of formal racial and gender equality to
root out structural forms of race and gender discrimination that the
same is likely to be true of sexual orientation, which is to say that even
if we were to achieve anti-discrimination laws on the basis of sexual
orientation throughout the country, even if we were to achieve
heightened scrutiny of discrimination against lesbians and gays, the
discrimination would find ways to persist. We rely, then, upon our
critical faculties to unearth subterranean subordination.
Critical study is committed to the project of destabilizing prevailing
norms, interrogating assumptions, and otherwise muddying what
appear to be clear waters. It is in large part through this
methodology that our political awareness of, and political opposition
to racism, sexism and homophobia emerge. But our legal
institutions, and the courtroom in particular, require that we
construct narratives that resonate with well-settled norms, values and
attitudes. Arguably, the duty of zealous representation requires that
we conform our narratives to these prevailing norms as well. Our
commitment to anti-subordination is therefore difficult to square
with our duty of zeal, given that as lawyers we operate not only in the
defined universe of a particular client representation, but in the
indeterminate universe of broader society as well. This is the
problem of generalized political commitments meeting individual
demands.
The tension here is significant. What if we conclude that the
"crack whore" defense, or the homophobic panic defense, is the
most effective for our clients? What if we believe, as I do, that
criminal defense lawyers are, by virtue of their structural position in
the criminal justice system, daily engaged in a battle against the
subordination of the state against poor people and against people of
color? Does that change our analysis about whether subordinating
17. Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of
People who do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 954 (2000).
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narratives are okay? Does the duty of zealous representation even
allow us not to employ such a narrative?
The ethical rules allow us to engage our clients in a discussion of
the broader implications of the narratives we construct. Model Rule
2.1 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation." 18 Model Code EC 7-9
allows a lawyer to ask his or her client for permission to forego an
action that the lawyer views as unjust, even if the action is in the best
interest of the client. 9 However, "the decision whether to forego
legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is
ultimately for the client and not for the lawyer." 20 And Model Rule
1.16(b) (4) states that a lawyer has discretion to withdraw from
representation if "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement. 21
The ethical rules just discussed concern the potential conflict
between a lawyer's duty to his or her client and the lawyer's fidelity to
his or her own moral code. But the ethical rules also recognize a
tension between a lawyer's duty to his or her client and an obligation
owed to third parties. Ethical Consideration 7-10 states: "The duty of
a lawyer to represent the client with zeal does not militate against the
concurrent obligations to treat with consideration all persons
involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless
harm."2  Thus, the progressive lawyer's commitment to anti-
subordination may find recognition in two qualifications on Lord
Brougham's absolutist view of the duty of zealous representation: the
lawyer's independent moral judgment, and the lawyer's professional
duty to third parties and to the public2 3 This is necessarily the case,
as the lawyer's moral judgments mediate her determination of what
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
19. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1981) (" [W] hen an action
in the best interest of the client seems to the lawyer to be unjust, the lawyer may ask
the client for permission to forego such action." ).
20. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (b) (4) (2002).
22. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1981).
23. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens,
30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 120 (quoting Lord Brougham in stating that the role of the
defense lawyer is that of an advocate, who, "in the discharge of his [the lawyer's]
duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is [the lawyer's]
client.").
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duty she owes to third parties.
As Bill Ong Hing notes, "The language encouraging the lawyer to
take responsibility is couched in terms of aspiration, rather than
professional duty." " The prospect of augmenting professional duty
to third parties or to the public good, at the expense of the lawyer's
commitment to the wishes of the client, is fraught with difficulty and
subject to immediate and predictable challenge. There is, for
example, an inherent subjectivity to the question of what constitutes
the public good, as any such determination requires the exercise of
individual judgment. Objections such as this are not easily overcome.
And yet, as lawyers we are called upon to exercise our judgment all
the time. Daily practice of law offers the best evidence of the ethical
rules' failure to provide bright line rules. This is to say that
conformity with the ethical rules demands the exercise of individual
judgment.
William Simon has argued that lawyers have ethical discretion to
refuse to "assist in the pursuit of legally permissible course of action"
if such assistance would run counter to justice." I wish to make a
more modest proposal: namely, that lawyers should engage their
clients in a meaningful discussion of the potential negative
consequences to others of their specific narrative choices.
Returning to the clinic's fictional client Randy Gilles, let us
imagine that he is African American. We might consider, first by
ourselves as his lawyers and then in conversation with him, how he
might feel about advancing a narrative that relies upon negative
stereotypes of African American women. The presumption is that he
wouldn't care. The presumption is that he will act purely out of self-
interest. But even if that is the case, how does he define self-interest?
Is it not within the realm of possibility that Randy Gilles would view
the lending of support to a racial stereotype about African Americans
as against self-interest? Even if, as the rules of ethics currently
provide, the ultimate decision rests solely with the client, it is, I would
argue, the duty of the lawyer to consider the broader implications of
the constructed narrative, and to engage the client in a conversation
about them. The language of the ethical rules discussed earlier is
permissive, and at best hortatory, of the kind of client counseling I
envision. I suggest that the rules should make such counseling
24. Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to
Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 922 (1995).
25. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083-84 (1988) (arguing that ethical discretion would "vindicate our legal ideals and
contribute to a more effective functioning of the lawyer role").
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mandatory.
It is important that we acknowledge and appreciate that as
individual, as particularized, and as client-centered as a
representation may be, it does not occur in a vacuum. It is true, as
my students have said in reaction to the Randy Gilles simulation, that
they are not going to be able to wipe away deeply entrenched sexism
or racism or homophobia through the choices they make about the
narrative to deploy in an individual case. But that truth cannot be
determinative of the question at hand, for just as the students' efforts
in an individual representation will not eradicate racism, sexism, or
homophobia, nor will a client's individual case, by itself, resolve the
systemic oppression of poor people by the criminal justice system.
Both efforts depend upon our aggregate efforts, and rely upon the
notion that our individual actions, no matter how small, are of
consequence. They matter. They are subject to moral scrutiny. Even
in the smallest of cases, we are as lawyers creatures in an ecosystem
that shifts and responds as we do.
Let me end with one final example which may help to clarify the
spillover effect that individualized narratives may have on the broader
society. I raise this example in part to illustrate how the ethics of
narrative apply in non-criminal as well as criminal cases. One of the
cases handled in the Washington College of Law's International Human
Rights Law Clinic last year involved a Christian individual in a
predominantly Muslim country who was seeking political asylum on
the grounds of religious persecution. In an early draft of their brief
to the immigration court, the students representing this client
employed the term "Muslim fundamentalist" in order to describe
their client's persecutors. The term "Muslim fundamentalist" has a
social and political currency in the popular imagination of the
United States, and undoubtedly in the minds of immigration judges.
It is, for example, used routinely in the media, and not just since
September 1 lth. Indeed, its use is so prevalent that even when only
the word "Muslim" is used, the term "fundamentalist" is almost
implied, suggesting that all Muslims are extremists. Edward Said
began making this argument in the 1970s.26 Certainly within the
Muslim community in the United States, the term "Muslim
fundamentalist" has risen (or sunk) to the level of epithet.
Assume that use of the term "Muslim fundamentalist" will find
favor with the judge and that it will be to the client's advantage.
26. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM 64 (1981) (arguing that Western
views, as shaped by media representation, associate "Islam" with punishment,
autocracy and medieval modes of logic).
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What does it matter if these clinic students employ the term "Muslim
fundamentalist"? They are just two students, in one client's case, in
one asylum case among a docket of thousands, in one immigration
court among hundreds. But it is not difficult to imagine that the
immigration judge who reads the brief and hears the case today
might next week or next month be considering the detention of an
Arab or Muslim immigrant under the latest anti-terrorism efforts of
the government. Imagine that the government can demonstrate no
affiliation of that immigrant to a known or suspected terrorist
organization. Imagine- and this is not difficult to do, given the state
of our anti-terrorism laws- the use of secret evidence that the
immigrant is allowed neither to see nor to challenge. It is, in my
mind, not a stretch at all to think that an immigration judge's
subscription to the broad application of the term "Muslim
fundamentalist" might affect her judgment on whether to permit the
immigrant's detention. We must be honest in our recognition of the
lawyer's role and responsibility in shaping this judge's judgment, and
how it might affect others in the future.
The lawyer-client relationship may be a confidential one, but it is
not wholly a private one. We can learn from queer theory the value
of transparency, of understanding that the acts of individuals are of
consequence to the collective. Is there a tension between zeal to the
individual client and commitment to anti-subordination? Of course
there is. But our fidelity to ourselves as lawyers depends upon the
honest embrace of such tension as a threshold step to its resolution.

THIRD ANNUAL
PETER M. CICCHINo AWARDS PROGRAM
LAWYERING AT THE MARGINS
April 18, 2002
Washington College of Law
American University

